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“Aloha Spirit required here,” reads a sign on the door of the Friendly 
Market in downtown Kaunakakai, an old-time grocery store on the island 
of Moloka‘i. “If you can’t share it today please visit us some other time.” 
The folksy kitchen-plaque humor refl ects so perfectly the ambiance of this 
most laid-back of Hawaiian Islands that tourists, I imagine, are invited to 
chuckle. Only a cynical mainlander like me, for whom the enchantment of 
the Islands has long since faded, would snicker that the Friendly Market 
on “The Friendly Island” is expressing the very opposite of what “aloha 
spirit” is understood to mean.
Back home in Honolulu, I am made acutely aware every day of my 
want of aloha—a quality I once tried to emulate by speaking softly and 
smiling a lot—as I sit honking my horn on the h-1 Freeway, a fi fteen-
mile commute that often takes nearly an hour in the congested, poorly 
planned gridlock that is the Aloha State. “Live Aloha,” reads the ubiq-
uitous bumper sticker on the minivan in front of me—a reminder that 
what makes Honolulu appear so civilized to outsiders is this willingness 
to accept patiently and silently the many daily irritations that come with 
rapid, uneven development, crumbling infrastructure, a third-world econ-
omy, and an entrenched political regime hell-bent on luring more tourists, 
industry, hotels, and military installations—all in the interest of exemplify-
ing that gracious social lubricant that has been called Hawai‘i’s “gift to the 
world” (Trask 1962).
The “Live Aloha” bumper sticker, part of a campaign by a citizens group 
in 1994 to reawaken “a sense of community” in Hawai‘i, is still often 
sought out in letters to the editor of Honolulu’s two daily newspapers. 
The group advocated twelve Acts of Aloha “intended to directly respond 
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to our day-to-day problems and sources of irritation.” The list begins, 
“Respect your elders and children,” and advises: “Return your shopping 
cart.” “Plant something.” “Create smiles” (Alm and others 1994). The 
panacea of aloha is not limited to social campaigns, however. In 1986 
the governor of Hawai‘i signed into law an “Aloha Spirit” bill (Hawai‘i 
Revised Statutes, section 5-7.5), which advises that lawmakers and state 
workers “contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration 
to the ‘Aloha Spirit,’” defi ned as that “coordination of mind and heart” 
that “brings each person to the self.” All three branches of government, 
the law says, “must think and emote good feelings to others.”
Such dewy-eyed sentimentality tends to call forth a tender indulgence 
on the part of hard-boiled observers from elsewhere, who fi nd it a refresh-
ing change from the places they have escaped in order to relax and reju-
venate in Hawai‘i. The Guardian of London defi ned aloha spirit cheekily 
as “hello, welcome and everything warm and squidgy” (Tran 1996). For 
longtime Hawai‘i residents, however, aloha is no joke. Not only does it 
point, as we shall see, toward the things closest to people’s hearts—fam-
ily, church, nation—but it also does so in a way that is understood to be 
uniquely Hawaiian, to “belong” to Hawai‘i, as so few things outside the 
realm of fad and fashion do. While aloha has been synonymous with the 
Islands for so long now that few people bother anymore with its myriad 
defi nitions—George Kanahele mentioned one study that counted 123 
(1986, 469)—this very taken-for-grantedness often serves to evoke clo-
sure where one would expect to see debate and dissent: in cases of confl ict. 
While it is true that evocation of such sentiments as love or compassion 
similarly defy defi nition through an effl orescence of excessive meaning, 
I propose that the signifi cation of aloha eludes us rather because it has 
served to obscure a history of traumatic meanings, all carrying political 
investments that remain hidden beneath the seemingly transparent uni-
versality of such private sentiments as love and kindness. As such, aloha 
spirit continues to serve as both social lubricant and glue, sticking people 
together while defl ecting attention from the problems of proximity. 
As a metonym for the Aloha State, “aloha spirit” bridges the gaps in 
the story of who we are and how we got here—migrant, Native,  tourist, 
or refugee—by taking refuge in love, which fi nds a way through or across 
difference rather than against it. In this way, aloha spirit works to bind a 
cultural and political entity whose membership is contested. Unresolved 
historical contests run beneath the surface, however, driving an economy 
of lack that keeps aloha in motion. For example, I learned only months 
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after my visit there that the Friendly Market posted its sign requiring aloha 
spirit of all who enter because of recent confl icts involving “attitude” by 
outsiders moving to an island that had been predominantly Native Hawai-
ian (Monson 2005). On Moloka‘i today, aloha spirit speaks a code that 
would not be understood by tourists in Waikïkï. It is in the interest of trac-
ing such hidden histories that I undertake this genealogy of the banal trope 
of aloha, as one analyzes dream fi gures to strip them of traumatic power.
Origins
Word meanings change over time, of course, taking on infl ections that 
refl ect shifting values in the culture in which they operate. The term 
“aloha,” according to a number of Hawaiian sources, did not have its 
current prominence in precontact Hawai‘i (Kanahele 1968; Ahlo 1996, 
11). Michele Nalani Ahlo reported that older Hawaiians she interviewed 
for her 1996 master’s thesis on the “Aloha Spirit Past and Present” told 
her the word was not used much by previous generations, and that it was 
“a slang” taken up by tourists (65, 105). Kanahele reported, in perhaps 
the only treatise on the subject, that while the root word is found through-
out Polynesia to mean love, compassion, sympathy, or kindness (aroha in 
Mäori, alofa in Samoan, aroha in Tahitian, etc), its earliest recorded uses 
in Hawai‘i emphasized “love of kin,” which included ancestors (1986, 
470). Aloha also is used in expressions that describe the welcome that 
should be extended to strangers (Kanahele 1986, 477). Kanahele con-
cluded, however, that although some Hawaiians today claim aloha was 
the most important of ancient Hawaiian values, evidence suggests it was 
just one among many important values (1986, 479). Elsewhere (Kanahele 
1968), he noted that such humanistic ideals “did not operate in a highly 
undemocratic, feudalistic society with a rigid system of taboos”; it was 
with Christian conversion that Hawaiians began to invest aloha with a 
new centrality. The term plays a similarly secondary role in the canonical 
contemporary account of postcontact history written by a Native Hawai-
ian, Lilikalä Kame‘eleihiwa’s Native Land and Foreign Desires (1992). 
Kame‘eleihiwa expanded on a number of metaphors central to the order-
ing of ancient Hawaiian society; aloha is not one of them.
It was early Western explorers to Hawai‘i who fi rst seized on aloha 
to describe their complicated admiration of Hawaiians as the “ideal 
natives”—the “noble savage” who represented Europe’s deep, relin-
quished past—as reported and repeated in the work of such chroniclers 
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as Jack London, Robert Louis Stevenson, Somerset Maugham, and Mark 
Twain. Generations of Europeans who waxed effusive on what they called 
Polynesian hospitality not only discovered in the Islands what they came 
to expect but also projected subjectivity in terms of their own culture. A 
revisionist Western history of the Pacifi c has since proposed that the “wel-
come” shown to Europeans was not so much a traditional outpouring as 
a product of careful strategy and experimentation on the part of Islanders 
confronted with a situation outside the norm (Campbell 2003). Polyne-
sian reciprocity in the exchange of food, land, and other resources was 
likewise viewed by Europeans through the lens of Christian virtue; gift-
giving and sharing do not appear to have had such moral ramifi cations 
within an economic system of clearly delineated obligations that required 
careful private accounting (Kanahele 1986, 377). All these aspects of the 
European-projected ideal—its Rousseauan desire for an Edenic “Other” 
intimately connected with, but wholly separate from, the modern Chris-
tian—found expression in the term “aloha.”
Christian missionaries arriving in the early 1800s thus found aloha 
to be a useful concept for “converting” local, pagan deities into a single 
Christian God (Kanahele 1986), and bridging the ontological gap from a 
hierarchical system of identity to discourses about the individual soul as 
determined by its moral choices. Arjun Appadurai noted that it was with 
the New Testament that “for the fi rst time in Western history, a major nor-
mative claim was made about the separability of act and actor, intention 
and action, ‘inner states’ and ‘outer forms,’” leading to “a complicated 
repertoire of discourses about the ‘individual,’ the ‘self,’ and ‘personality’” 
(1990, 92). Christian infl uence thus contributed an important trajectory 
of meaning to aloha spirit, deployed by the missionaries to bridge the con-
siderable lacuna between two models of community: the Western, which 
upholds the supremacy of the individual, and the Hawaiian, in which 
religion is not a set of beliefs separate from civic society, but part of the 
very structure of social organization. Given Europe’s role in constructing 
Hawai‘i through narrative and imagery, Kanahele concluded that the con-
cept “we feel or perceive as aloha today is the product of evolution, even 
the child of the marriage of an ancient, traditional Polynesian concept 
with its Christian counterpart” (1986, 482). We still feel the discordance 
in this stretch from “love of kin” to “brotherly love” (agape) in the con-
temporary slogan “Aloha ke akua” (God is love), given that the Hawaiian 
cosmological hierarchy was more likely to arouse in the commoner “fear, 
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awe, respect, loyalty, obedience” than the emotion we call love (Kanahele 
1986, 478). 
Discordant as the pagan and Christian cosmologies might be, the mis-
sionaries succeeded in quickly Christianizing a number of infl uential 
Hawaiian monarchs, most importantly Queen Ka‘ahumanu, who toured 
the countryside in the late 1820s ordering temples destroyed and churches 
built over them, after she engineered an end to the kapu (taboo) system 
(Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, 68, 74, 154). The attraction of Christianity for most 
of the population initially was learning palapala (to read and write), for the 
missionaries introduced Hawaiians to a written language. “Once the Ali‘i 
Nui [chiefs] had approved it, learning the palapala became a national pas-
time,” so that royalty and commoners alike thronged the mission schools 
long before they felt any interest in the church sermons (Kame‘eleihiwa 
1992, 142). Based on Benedict Anderson’s evolutionary history of nation-
alism and nationhood as turning on the development of print capitalism, I 
would argue that it was the advent of a written language and the fl owering 
of a Hawaiian-language press beginning in the 1830s, more than Chris-
tianity itself, that fi lled the void after the kapu system was abandoned.1 
With the decline of ancient ways of life and their “interlinked certainties” 
around organic community and religious hierarchies, print capitalism 
fi lled the need for “a new way of linking fraternity, power and time mean-
ingfully together” (Anderson 1991, 36). Printed texts encourage growing 
numbers of people to think about themselves in profoundly new ways—as 
connected to other readers of the same language, forming “in their secular, 
particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined com-
munity” (Anderson 1991, 44). To quote Timothy Brennan paraphrasing 
Georg Lukács, with the breakdown of authoritarian hierarchies and the 
disintegration of organic community in antiquity, “When the bourgeois 
individual became the dominant myth, the external became the internal, 
the worldly became the textual” (Brennan 1990, 54).
Some Hawaiians have maintained that until the eighteenth-century 
European explorations, Islanders had no notion of belonging to a particu-
lar nation, race, ethnicity, or people, because Hawai‘i was cut off from 
even other Pacifi c Islands for hundreds of years (Campbell 2003, 65). “The 
concept of nationality was completely alien to my people,” wrote Samuel 
Crowningburg-Amalu, a Honolulu Advertiser columnist and descendant 
of Hawaiian royalty who waxed philosophical on the Hawaiian cultural 
renaissance of the 1970s; “There were only the Ali‘i [chiefs] who were 
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heaven born and the Maka‘ainana [commoners] who were born of Earth. 
No other” (1974). 
This idea of nationhood and “Hawaiian-ness,” born of the printed 
word, forms an important proprietary connection to aloha and the dis-
course that forms around it with the arrival of immigrants and other set-
tlers in the decades that follow. Both groups, however, construct the nation 
around aloha retrospectively. For the four decades until Hawai‘i became 
an American state in 1959, Honolulu’s daily newspaper index contains 
no such subject heading as “aloha spirit.” After about 1962, by contrast, 
“aloha spirit” became a burning subject of public debate, spawning a 
steady stream of newspaper reports about initiatives, declarations, public 
and private forums, and the ubiquitous letters to the editor from tourists 
who did, or did not, experience aloha on their visit—a genre unique to 
Hawai‘i that seems to owe its existence to the fact that aloha is indeed a 
newspaper subject category. This preoccupation continued through the 
1970s into the early 1980s, marked always by a sense of anguish and 
urgency related to the question of loss: Is the aloha spirit lost? Is it dying? 
Does it exist? 
The need to construct a discourse around aloha in the decade after 
statehood clearly refl ected anxieties about how different social groups 
stood to gain or lose after the change in Hawai‘i’s status. Community 
hopes and dreams, political goals, and historical traumas come to bear 
on such moments of transition, bringing to the surface internal confl icts 
that might have remained hidden. At the same time, there arose within 
Hawai‘i a new self-awareness about being part of, but different from, the 
union—an awareness brought home by the sudden infl ux of curious tour-
ists attracted by newly affordable jet travel. 
It was the tourism industry, in fact, that issued the fi rst warnings about 
a loss of aloha, which it “branded” as Hawai‘i’s most important com-
petitive edge against other beach resorts worldwide. Aloha spirit is “that 
extra warmth that conveys a personal interest in satisfying the customer’s 
needs,” according to a University of Hawai‘i tourism professor who con-
ducted a survey in 1962 to measure the growing impersonality of store 
clerks (Honolulu Advertiser 1962). Among residents, by contrast, debate 
about the aloha spirit evokes something quite different. As a way of life 
said to be lost or dying, it is associated with “the good old days,” before 
the accelerated arrival of modern infl uences that are seen as precipitating 
a decline in friendliness. This meaning, which encompasses myriad aspects 
of Island life in “small-kid time” (depending on the speaker, anytime 
dialogue • ohnuma 371
before 1970), resonates strongly to this day. And it is under this heading 
that aloha spirit—still connoting “love of kin” through nostalgia for rural 
life in the extended family—proliferates in forms of Christian love unique 
to Hawai‘i, such as “seeing a friend off at 3:00 a.m.,” “the smell of kalua 
pig” (Kanahele 1976, np), or the “Hawaiian practice of setting political 
campaign posters not on sticks, but in the hands of human campaigners 
who establish eye contact with commuters passing by on the way home” 
(Mathews 1986).
In a speech given on the occasion of statehood, the Reverend Abra-
ham Akaka, Hawai‘i’s “shepherd” and leader of the august missionary 
Kawaiaha‘o Church for three decades, attempted to fi x aloha in strictly 
Christian terms, emphasizing the missionary parallel between Polynesian 
“love of kin” and brotherly love, or the Golden Rule: “Aloha seeks to do 
good to a person, with no conditions attached. . . . A person who has the 
spirit of aloha loves even when the love is not returned. And such is the 
love of God. . . . Today, one of the deepest needs of mankind is the need 
to feel a sense of kinship one with another. Truly all mankind belongs 
together, for from the very beginning all mankind has been called into 
being, nourished, watched over by the love of God, who is aloha. . . .The 
real Golden Rule is aloha. This is the way of life we must affi rm” (Joesting 
1979).
The uncomplicated lineage drawn here from ancient ways of life to the 
present situation of statehood demonstrates what Eric Hobsbawm called 
the “invention of tradition.” According to Hobsbawm, claiming a link to 
“a suitable historic past” in times of great change helps call forth certain 
values or norms that have “the sanction of precedent, social continuity 
and natural law as expressed in history” (1983, 2). The missionaries’ con-
version of pagan gods to the Christian God “invented” such a tradition; 
subsequently, the discourse of aloha was reiterated and institutionalized 
by Akaka in the moniker ultimately adopted for Hawai‘i, “The Aloha 
State.” Indeed, while Hobsbawm described the phenomenon of invented 
tradition as widespread throughout history, he noted that it is especially 
conspicuous as a strategy of nation building, “when a rapid transforma-
tion of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which ‘old’ 
traditions had been designed” (1983, 4). This is clearly the case with “love 
of kin,” which cannot extend the extended family large enough to encom-
pass mass tourism. 
Rev Akaka established yet another infl ection of meaning on aloha in the 
decade that followed his statehood speech. In many ways the fi rst architect 
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of the Hawaiian cultural renaissance, he addressed the group’s myriad 
social problems—poverty, crime, poor health, breakdown of the family—
through a program of “Hawaiian uplift” aimed at restoring a sense of 
“identity” (Akaka 1970). Acknowledging the stereotype that Hawaiians 
remain at the bottom of the social ladder because they are “noncompeti-
tive” and “happy-go-lucky” (HSB 1962b), he recast these tendencies under 
the Christian paradigm “blessed are the meek,” noting: “Out of drab little 
Nazareth, the hope and faith of Christianity came. Out of our Hawaiian 
people great things will come” (HSB 1963). With this move, aloha begins 
to transform an internal, psychological orientation into a political iden-
tity—an operation that continues to underwrite the signifi cance of, and 
hide the investments in, aloha spirit today. 
From Tourism Commodity to State Ideology
The Christian lineage of aloha, so important symbolically at the inception 
of statehood, was nearly overwhelmed in the decades that followed by 
the powerful twin interests of state government and its economic growth 
engine, tourism. It is the commodifi ed aloha that most people know 
best—emblazoned across the landscape of Waikïkï, announced in the bus 
driver’s distorted “a-lo-o-o-o-o-ha!” and stamped across every retail wel-
come mat. Concerns about disappearing aloha had no sooner opened the 
public conversation than tourism began to balloon exponentially, grow-
ing twenty-three-fold from 1960 to nearly seven million tourists a year in 
1990 (dbedt 2004). Business, government, civic groups—and especially 
the Hawai‘i Visitors Bureau—rushed to keep pace, erecting educational 
projects designed to ensure that workers and residents would do their part 
to deliver on Hawai‘i’s “destination image” (Desmond 1999, 13). 
“You’ve got to give it that extra pizzazz,” a class of airport workers was 
told in a 1976 state tourism seminar. “We really are a fragile business, and 
that’s where all of you come in. Aloha spirit is our most valuable visitor 
attraction” (Harpham 1976). As a fetishized commodity, aloha did not yet 
manage to obscure capitalism’s dependence on workers enjoined to show 
their patriotism by underwriting the state’s top export—with lingering 
implications for the kinship community of old. The message was repeated 
in public-service ads in 1982, again sponsored by the state-funded tour-
ism bureau, which reminded residents: “Aloha. The more we give, the 
more we’ve got”—a self-evident “we” that the head of the Hotel Workers 
Union unmasked by saying it would be better if “tourist industry execu-
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tives practice[d] the aloha spirit with their employees instead of promoting 
[it] in an advertising campaign” (Catterall 1982).
While the tourism offi ce now known as the Hawai‘i Visitors and Con-
vention Bureau claims to serve a range of public and private interests, the 
State of Hawai‘i has always had a clear stake in promoting tourism and 
the commercial aspects of aloha. Noel Kent noted in his critical history 
of modern Hawai‘i that the state’s “economic model was based from its 
beginnings on the utter primacy of tourism, since outside investors would 
only direct their funds to this profi table sector, while government capital 
resources had to be focused on infrastructural activities aimed at attract-
ing these same investors” (1993, 125). 
But it was not just as an economic engine that aloha spirit became 
interesting to the emerging State of Hawai‘i after 1960. With the “Demo-
cratic revolution” of 1954, the offspring of immigrant plantation workers 
had fi nally succeeded in forging a working-class coalition that could take 
control of the territorial legislature from the haole (white) sugar planta-
tion elite. This Democratic coalition—which still holds political power 
in Hawai‘i today—consciously undertook the promotion of both tourism 
and statehood to underwrite its political project, one that has elevated 
the older Asian immigrant groups socially and economically through syn-
ergistic relationships between government, law, tourism, and real estate. 
Jocelyn Linnekin summarized: “Though historically debatable, the notion 
that Hawaiian society had overcome ethnic divisiveness became a domi-
nant public ideology during the territorial period. . . . As a public ideology 
in and about Hawaii, aloha became particularly salient after World War 
II. . . . The rise of mass tourism and lobbying for statehood were more-
or-less concurrent movements in the 1950s, and the idea of interethnic 
harmony was advantageous for both. As the descendants of immigrants 
moved off the plantations, local people too came to share this sanguine 
vision of Hawaii as a unique place, and aloha became the normative ideal 
for civil behavior” (1997, 227).
In other words, debate about the loss of aloha spirit could not only 
be turned toward founding Hawai‘i as a specifi cally Christian state (with 
Calvinist implications for the moral value of work), but could equally be 
used in service of a political ideology that claimed to transcend ethnic dif-
ference under a fl ag marked Democratic, local, and working class (Wilson 
2000, 75). The tourism industry, which originally fi xated on aloha as that 
“extra something” of hospitality, quickly realized that what Americans 
found unique about Hawai‘i was its multiracial population coexisting 
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in apparent harmony. Promoters of statehood and state interests seized 
on the equation of aloha with multiculturalism—or “melting pot,” as it 
was called then—with evangelical fervor, declaring it Hawai‘i’s gift to the 
world. Beginning with a state-appointed commission in 1973, efforts to 
institutionalize this difference culminated in the “Aloha Spirit” wording 
added to the state constitution in 1986. Such a visibly successful recipe 
for melting-pot integration, brought to the world courtesy of America, 
land of immigrants, presented a striking argument for Hawai‘i itself as the 
American ideal. “Hawaii stands as a symbol of what America could be,” 
according to the state’s top education offi cial in 1962 (HSB 1962a).2 
Aloha as commodity continues to excite in white America the fascina-
tion with the Other that began with Europeans in the 1800s. This is the 
aloha that tourists experience as the “almost, but not quite” of Native 
hospitality, a distance that keeps them coming back for the experience 
of pleasurably negotiating the gap of racial difference (Desmond 1999, 
140)—“a nonthreatening, alluring encounter with paradisical exoticism” 
that is “primitive (but delightfully so)” (Desmond 1999, 4, 7). Selling 
Hawai‘i as neither black nor Asian but rather belonging to Europe’s deep 
past corresponded politically to “assertions of nationalism—how and in 
what ways Hawai‘i . . . was just the same as the rest of the United States, 
and how and in what ways it was different” (Desmond 1999, 7, 56). 
Aloha as a claim to racial tolerance also tied in to a larger discourse about 
America’s commitment to democracy and racial equality, especially with 
the growth of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and ‘70s, a point to 
which I return later.
In all of these infl ections, aloha spirit as a state ideology effectively 
serves to contain or dissipate political resistance, as Linnekin pointed 
out (1997, 228). The commonsense commandment to love one’s neigh-
bor inhibits calling attention to the ways that certain ethnic groups in 
Hawai‘i have fared much better than others. Indeed, melting-pot aloha 
was the dominant ideology for so many years that it was not until the 
1980s that Native Hawaiian activists, political analysts, and sociologists 
started to quantify the huge gaps becoming apparent between the sta-
tus of the early Asian immigrants—some subgroups of which now have 
higher average incomes than whites—and Native Hawaiians, Filipinos, 
and Pacifi c Islanders. By camoufl aging such differences under the banner 
of multicultural harmony, and partitioning political discourse according 
to moral mandates to “show aloha,” aloha discourse has served to stoke 
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the sale of Hawai‘i as a commodity destination while distracting atten-
tion from the lopsided economic model at its foundation: outside capital 
invited to speculate in real estate while funneling profi ts to political insid-
ers, in exchange for publicly funded infrastructure and eased barriers to 
development (Kent 1993). 
Aloha ‘Äina and the “Local Nation” 
The melting-pot myth has been discredited in recent decades as failing to 
acknowledge the uncelebrated root causes of Island ethnic diversity: the 
armed takeover of the indigenous population and an exploitive contract 
labor system (Okamura 1998; Edles 2004, 40). Since the late 1990s it has 
given way to a more critical understanding of what is known in Hawai‘i 
as “Local” identity. A product of the postwar immigrant labor coalition 
that defeated the haole elite, “Local” became a popular identity for native-
born nonwhite residents in the 1960s and ‘70s to express their resistance 
to growing outsider infl uence, especially by mainland whites. The popular 
press still celebrates markers of Local solidarity such as Hawai‘i Pidgin 
English, and customs like removing shoes indoors, the omnipresent multi-
ethnic potluck, and greeting visitors with lei. 
From another perspective, “Local” as an assertion of multiculturalism 
also formed in reaction to the growing Hawaiian sovereignty movement 
of the 1970s, which barred non-Natives from identifying as “Hawai-
ian” (Fujikane 1994). Formulated as a 1970s-style cultural nationalism 
that sought to express resistance to being subsumed under a continental 
“Asian-American” identity (Fujikane 1994), Localism is often criticized 
now as a problematic claim to nationalism whose discourse of pride and 
rights serves to occlude how Asian immigrant settlers, specifi cally, have 
profi ted from the colonial enterprise under the cover of anti-haole senti-
ment (Trask 2000).3 Hawaiian activist Haunani-Kay Trask wrote that “the 
‘local’ identity tag blurs the history of Hawai‘i’s only indigenous people 
while staking a settler claim” (2000, 4). She elaborated: 
Calling themselves “local,” the children of Asian settlers . . . claim Hawai‘i as 
their own, denying indigenous history, their long collaboration in our contin-
ued dispossession, and the benefi ts therefrom. 
Part of this denial is the substitution of the term “local” for “immigrant,” 
which is, itself, a particularly celebrated American gloss for “settler.”. . . 
Hawai‘i, like the continent, is naturalized as but another telling illustration of 
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the uniqueness of America’s “nation of immigrants.”. . . Exploitative planta-
tion conditions thus underpin a master narrative of hard work and the end-
lessly celebrated triumph over anti-Asian racism. . . . 
For our Native people, Asian success proves to be but the latest elaboration 
of foreign hegemony. (Trask 2000, 2) 
The discourse of aloha contributes to the Local project by subsuming 
ethnic difference under the banner of aloha spirit. A skillful example is 
found in a 1993 celebration of Hawai‘i multiculturalism by Local apolo-
gists Glen Grant and Dennis M Ogawa (1993). The authors held that 
aloha kanaka—the love of one’s fellow human beings, as exemplifi ed by 
the Hawaiian monarchy—curtailed prejudice and interracial violence 
among immigrant groups, so that all folded into a “pidgin culture” that 
formed “the basis for a powerful self-perception of islanders that they are 
uniquely multicultural in their lifestyles” (1993, 149). Grant and Ogawa 
evoked “points of commonality” between immigrant children and Native 
Hawaiians, especially rural life in the extended family, which “transcended 
specifi c ethnic groups.” Aloha as emblematic of the “good old days” that 
were centered around the extended family in “small-kid time” taught all 
of Hawai‘i’s children the hegemonic aloha values of “reliance on group 
interdependency, reciprocal obligations, an open attitude toward sharing, 
and a reluctance to engage in self-promotion or aggression” (Grant and 
Ogawa 1993, 150). The rubric of “love” greases this semantic slide by 
naturalizing the link between family and nation: Idioms of kinship and 
home both “denote something to which one is naturally tied,” so that 
“nations inspire . . . often profoundly self-sacrifi cing love” (Anderson 
1991, 143, 141). 
What is notable about Grant and Ogawa’s proposal—along with others 
by the “children of Asian settlers”—is an emotional cadence barely con-
tained within the language of scholarly objectivity. Its tone can range from 
conciliatory to abject, and at critical moments threatens to displace the 
text from the author’s argument to how he or she feels. Later in this article 
I return to this appeal to feelings that occurs around aloha. Here I would 
simply point out that for Asian Locals, evocations of aloha seem intended 
to answer an irreconcilable gap in political identity—in contemporary 
psychological jargon, anxiety, guilt, or shame (Isaki 1996; Fuji kane 1994, 
30)—which for many years was manifested as an overweening eagerness 
to champion the cause of aloha and stamp the nation-state with its brand.4 
To me, a Japanese-American raised on the US continent, such easy owner-
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ship of a communal egalitarian principle still resonates as part of the disori-
enting Hawai‘i experience of being mistaken for a large insider “we”—like 
being white in America. To my ears, rather than political identity, aloha 
as pronounced by Asian Locals carries a tone of wishful nostalgia for the 
culture-wide “small-kid time” before Asian immigrants were coerced into 
renouncing their homelands (as Japanese-American internees during World 
War II were advised) or modeling the dominant capitalist paradigm as evi-
dence of their rehabilitation (Kent 1993, 130). As an imaginary construct, 
this longing for a long-lost coherent unity appears to be an instance of 
what is called in subaltern politics “fetishization of the wound.” In Wendy 
Brown’s terms, the wound—in this case, renunciation of past identity—
“comes to stand for identity itself” as something that just is, outside of 
history, cut off from a history of injury and substituted by the sign of pain 
as spectacle (Brown quoted in Ahmed 2004, 32). Under the discourse of 
aloha, the fetishized sacrifi ces of nisei (second-generation Japanese Ameri-
cans) and other Locals—symbolized by the World War II heroism of the 
Japanese-American 442nd Regimental Combat Team and the iconic loss of 
Senator Daniel Inouye’s right arm—undergoes conversion as a repeatable 
individual act of “choosing” love, a salve that promises “safety, comfort, 
caring and coming to terms that can underwrite experiences that would 
otherwise be traumatic” (Isaki 2006, paraphrasing Berlant 2001, 448). 
Here again, aloha serves to smooth over an otherwise traumatic transition 
from the past, reenacting identifi cation with the injured community as a 
politically astute manifestation of personal autonomy. 
To delve further into the compensations of aloha for Local identity, 
even the contrite settler’s version that owns up to complicity in Native 
dispossession still makes claims on either end of what I would call the 
Hawaiian / haole semiotics of desire. For when it comes to the mythic 
landscape of aloha uniting the white European with his “soft primitive,” 
the Oriental has always been excluded. Jane Desmond’s study of the con-
struction of Hawai‘i as a tourist destination fi nds the Islands personifi ed 
as a welcoming hula girl who is hapa haole—half white, half Polynesian, 
“literally embodying the fantasy of the nativizing trope, melding the two 
bodies into one” (1999, 8). Adria L Imada has written of the “imagined 
intimacy” between Hawai‘i and Americans fostered by mainland hula 
shows, in which live bodies delivered a powerful message of Hawai‘i and 
the United States as “inseparable and dependent on each other,” while 
usefully cleansing Asians from America’s Pacifi c territory (2004, 135). 
While Hawaiians were considered by haole to be “their” ideal natives, 
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Asian immigrants were pictured as coolies “unable to assimilate and 
prone to socially dangerous habits such as opium smoking and cockfi ght-
ing,” which were “seen as threatening to the fragile moral capacity of the 
Native Hawaiians” (Merry 2003, 215). Unable to be pictured alongside 
the object of the desiring European gaze, the tens of thousands of mostly 
male immigrants working the plantations in the early part of the twentieth 
century “were rendered all but invisible” in tourist promotions (Desmond 
1999, 58). 
The image of the hated Oriental, desexualized and undesirable (to 
whites), permeates Asian immigrant calls for aloha that paradigmatically 
(through association with a “Local nation”) invite a shared mistrust of 
and disgust toward the outsider, read here as white. Jonathan Y Okamura 
pointed to that strain in Local culture and identity that expresses “resis-
tance and opposition to external forces of development and change . . .
that have marginalized Hawaii’s people” (1998, 273). If markers of 
belong ing in America or to an increasingly transnational cultural elite fail 
to be achieved, the Local can take refuge in the uniqueness of aloha—“the 
essence of local integrity and authenticity . . . which alone is his” (Farrell 
1982, 351).
Such Local and Western claims to aloha clearly pose problems for 
the Hawaiian nationalist movement that took shape in the 1970s. As a 
Hawaiian word rooted in Polynesian ways of life, aloha belongs fi rst and 
foremost to Hawaiians, who are uniquely situated to determine its appli-
cations. Yet aloha spirit as constructed works against Hawaiian interests 
in multiple ways: 
(1)  by subsuming the asymmetrical political claims of immigrant-settlers 
and indigenous people under the umbrella of Christian  equality; 
(2)  by containing any political resistance that would foreground such 
claims; 
(3)  by continuing to invite the exploitation of land and other resources 
by the tourism industry; and 
(4)  by substituting feel-good intentions for any material remediation of 
colonial exploitation. 
It can be no coincidence that the contest to defi ne aloha heightened in 
step with Native Hawaiian efforts to “take back” what was stolen—spe-
cifi cally land, and by extension culture—beginning in the 1970s. But an 
aloha taken back and revitalized for a restored Hawaiian nation had 
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to be divested of meanings that opened rifts in the fabric of Hawaiian 
nationalism, such as citing aloha to explain why land was “given away” 
or rights were not asserted. Accordingly, Rev Akaka proposed as part of 
his “Hawaiian uplift” campaign: “The old way of Aloha was to give away 
everything—even 90 percent of our life, and then to give away about 80 
percent of our living space. There obviously is something wrong with that 
kind of Aloha. The new Aloha will need to be according to the teaching 
of our Lord Jesus Christ: Love yourself as you love your neighbor. . . . We 
must add the quality of rational foresight to our Aloha, so that we will 
have a vital and important place in the future of our homeland” (Akaka 
1970). Further complicating aloha was any reference to the Hawaiian 
monarchs’ decision to “abandon the violent path of [the war god] Kü” 
in favor of Christian pacifi sm, a “turning point for the Hawaiian nation” 
(Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, 153). Invoking aloha at such moments might 
emphasize historical agency on the part of Hawaiian forebears, but at the 
price of further sacrifi cing the trope as a symbol of Hawaiian strength.
The Hawaiian nationalist movement has instead infl ected the origins of 
aloha in a completely different direction, reinstalling the concept of aloha 
‘äina from the anti-annexation movement of 1898. Aloha ‘äina—literally, 
“love of the land,” a coinage that Noenoe Silva traced to the political 
group Hui Hawai‘i Aloha ‘Äina, formed in 1893 to protest the overthrow 
of the Hawaiian government (2004, 11)—has usually been translated 
“patriotism,” as in the Hawaiian Patriotic League. But this obscures the 
genealogical, cosmological infl ections to “nation / land” in Hawaiian (Silva 
2004, 130; Trask 1999, 128; Pukui 1974, 269). Kame‘eleihiwa identifi ed 
aloha ‘äina with the Hawaiian reciprocal duty to love, honor, and serve 
one’s ancestors (1992, 25). Here “patriotism”—or, more properly, nation-
alism—expresses a duty to care for the earth from which the people origi-
nate, to reciprocate its support of the people. The idiom thus underscores 
an important difference from the claims of immigrant settlers asserting a 
“Local nation,” for it establishes a genealogical origin in the land as the 
true basis for territorial rights. Aloha ‘äina works to “take back” aloha 
from collusion with capitalist exploitation and alienation, renaming the 
nation as land—Hawai‘i nei, the material basis for culture—rather than 
as place, or “a shared space of . . . ‘homogeneous, empty time’” (Fujikane 
1994, 29) in the metaphorical imaginary. 
In practice, this renaming corresponds to reclaiming a land base to per-
petuate Hawaiian culture, a political project that began in 1973 with the 
Homerule Movement and a group suitably dubbed aloha (Aboriginal 
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Lands of Hawaiian Ancestry), and culminated in the fourteen-year cam-
paign to take back the island of Kaho‘olawe, used as a US Navy bombing 
range since World War II. Amid academic challenges by white anthropolo-
gists as to whether this volcano southwest of Maui was considered sacred 
“traditionally,” as Hawaiians claimed, or as part of an “invented tradi-
tion” serving political ends (Linnekin 1983, 246), Haunani-Kay Trask 
asserted the right precisely for Hawaiians to defi ne what belongs to their 
culture, as “the only residents with a genealogical claim to their place,” 
and whose cultural survival depends on the right to such self-determined 
standards for ethnicity (1999, 127, 132; see also Tobin 1994, 116). 
Complications arise, however, in representing such standards of authen-
ticity by means of a decolonized aloha, for the term’s history already con-
tains within it competing markers of nationhood. Rey Chow wrote of 
the struggle between the dominant and subdominant within postcolonial 
Native culture: “To argue for the autonomy of a historiography by the 
‘natives’ themselves, so that the past that has been usurped from them can 
become available and accessible once again in the ‘native’ language, we 
would need at the same time to acknowledge (1) the impurity of that ‘past’ 
and (2) the vicissitudes of the ‘native’ language, which is also impure and 
multiple because it is in constant practical use” (1998, 153).
As one of the few Hawaiian words in the English-language dictionary, 
aloha draws attention to the “impure and multiple” elements in Hawai-
ian identity itself, interrupted only recently by cultural renaissance and 
political nationalism. Christianity, for example, can hardly be spoken of 
anymore as a foreign imposition on an “authentic” Hawaiian culture. 
Hawaiian gatherings often open with a Christian blessing, while teach-
ers of hula and other Hawaiian spiritual practitioners frequently profess 
strong Christian faith (Viotti 2001; Adamski 1997). The fi gure of the 
“good Christian” who supports Native self-determination dates to the 
missionary era, with David Malo, and Joseph Näwahï, whom Jonathan 
Osorio called “the living promise of the Calvinist mission and an exemplar 
of that mission’s contradictions” (quoted in Silva 2004, 139). For Native 
Christians, conversion plays a central role in the story of how their people 
have assimilated change, and aloha as “brotherly love” has perhaps the 
widest resonance in the public at large. 
Likewise, Hawai‘i’s identity as what Michel Picard has called a “touris-
tic culture” (1997), in which tourism has played a developmental cultural 
role, persists in the performative history of such revived Hawaiian prac-
tices as hula and surfi ng (Desmond 1999, 99). The Mossman family, for 
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example, mounted entrepreneurial extravaganzas at their reconstructed 
Hawaiian village in Waikïkï in the early 1930s to satisfy tourists’ thirst 
for “authentic” native performances such as hula dancing, poi pounding, 
and watching boys climb coconut trees; they also intended this forum to 
educate fellow Hawaiians and resurrect disappearing cultural practices 
(Imada 2004, 119). Imada has concluded that tourism development was 
largely responsible for the revival of hula, and that tourism and cultural 
activism did not pose contradictions for many Hawaiians in the entertain-
ment business (2004, 123). Like Christianity, tourism has helped shape 
contemporary Hawaiian culture, and its infl uence persists in the Hawaiian 
cultural gloss on aloha today. 
The Problem with Love
Earlier I mentioned the “Live Aloha” campaign from 1994—the product 
of public meetings that concluded that driving with courtesy, returning 
your shopping cart, and other personal actions would counteract a grow-
ing sense of powerlessness in public life. This campaign demonstrates how 
aloha has become the vehicle in Hawai‘i for a phenomenon described by 
Lauren Berlant, among others, as a retreat from the political to the domain 
of “personal acts and identities performed in the intimate domains of the 
quotidian” (1997, 4). For social conservatives, such a retreat is manifest 
in recourse to the moral certainties of the church; on the liberal side, it is 
seen in a New Age psycho-spiritual paradigm claiming continuity with 
an authentic American tradition that defends against capitalist modernity 
(which I would trace to the transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau). 
Both of these positions tend to be couched in the rubric of love. Bianca 
Isaki paraphrased Berlant: “In American political culture today, love is . . 
. a social ligament between fantastic signs of intimacy that are terrorized 
into privacy. That is, it offers the hyperbole of its promise as cause for 
relinquishing a public life. The promise to defend love’s normative priva-
tive forms is exchanged for a public that forfeits political community as 
yet another concession to a mood of diminished expectations” (2006).
In Hawai‘i it is aloha spirit that facilitates this retreat from political life. 
The “Live Aloha” campaign’s private “Acts of Aloha,” for example, defl ect 
attention from questioning how hegemonic ideologies such as aloha itself 
might contribute to “the crippling sense of powerlessness, the all-too-per-
vasive attitude in this state that our individual acts do not matter” (Alm 
and others 1994). Similarly, two recent books that purport to teach aloha 
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wrap together a mishmash of past meanings under the privatizing project 
of New Age healing and what Frank Furedi has called “therapy culture,” 
in which “management of emotions involves intervening in areas hitherto 
regarded as private” (2004, 50).
The Lessons of Aloha: Stories of the Human Spirit by Hawaiian musi-
cian and social activist “Brother Noland” Conjugacion is a coffee-table 
book that through its descriptive/prescriptive gloss on a state ideology 
participates in the political project of nation building. Brother Noland 
collected several dozen stories by prominent or socially active Hawai‘i 
residents who narrate, in the fi rst person and with Pidgin infl ections intact, 
stories of hardship overcome or bad decisions forestalled through an inter-
nal orientation that refl ects “their passion for life” (Brother Noland 2005, 
xi). “What’s this book all about? Mostly, it’s about how each of us might 
live Aloha to the fullest. Aloha is always there, of course, nestled deep 
within our inner spirit. Our challenge is to bring it to the surface. The 
magic of Aloha happens when your best and highest expression can fl ow 
naturally and honestly. It might be as simple as the look in your eyes, 
or as deep as the gift of unconditional love. Aloha can be acquired, dis-
covered, learned, earned, given, shared and passed along—and that’s the 
idea behind The Lessons of Aloha, a survival tool for the 21st century . . .
saimin [noodle soup] for the soul” (2005, xiv).
Like the Chicken Soup for the Soul franchise to which it refers (one of 
whose hundreds of titles is Chicken Soup from the Soul of Hawai‘i: Sto-
ries of Aloha to Create Paradise Wherever You Are [Canfi eld and others 
2003]), Brother Noland’s collection operates on the idea that one’s ability 
to be moved by reading stories about others’ experiences and expressions 
of love is itself an act of aloha. This is because feeling demonstrates that 
deep inner quality of aloha being moved to the surface, which can then be 
manifested publicly (according to the text) by “phrases like ‘Thank you,’ 
‘Forgive me,’ ‘I’m sorry,’ ‘We can work it out,’ . . . . It weaves itself into 
the next step, which is questioning our actions: Did I ask permission? Am 
I being too nosy? Am I imposing?” (Brother Noland 2005, 2). The signs 
of aloha collected in the stories do not so much demonstrate a philosophy 
as enact what could be summed up by our British cynic as “hello, welcome 
and everything warm and squidgy.” We learn that aloha is fi nding the 
answers to life “deep within”; it’s not compromising your values, not tak-
ing life for granted, valuing your friends, and fi nding humor in everything 
(2005, 7, 15, 23, 27, 30). Most of the stories are just heartwarming, like 
the Chicken Soup stories, serving to realize the modern understanding 
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of emotion as constructing our individual uniqueness through “access to 
some kind of inner truth about the self” (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990, 6). 
The same tone runs through the gift-type volume A Little Book of 
Aloha: Spirit of Healing (Provenzano 2003). Renata Provenzano inter-
viewed Hawaiian healers “as to how the spirit of aloha is in fact the key 
to Hawaiian well-being” (2003, 10). Here, too, aloha is an internal orien-
tation: “It’s an inner knowledge, by birth, to be loving and genuine in all 
interactions”; it is kindness, honesty, empathy, and a willingness to love 
(Provenzano 2003, 14). It begins with the self: “The answer is when you 
look inside yourself—do you feel good about yourself, are you secure of 
who you are?” (Provenzano 2003, 21) This orientation is described by 
Furedi as part of a growing tendency in the West to construct identity 
on the basis not only of emotion, but also of emotional defi cit (ie, “low 
self-esteem”) as a “version of the self . . . marked by powerlessness and 
vulnerability” (2004, 144). Like Berlant, Furedi linked the current preoc-
cupation with monitoring individual emotions to a loss of faith in politics, 
and a concomitant erosion of private life (2004, 40, 48). As the public 
sphere is reduced to the intimate, domestic, and emotional, what becomes 
important in public life is “gestures of being down to earth, warm and 
emotional rather than the quality of ideas, strategic thought or leader-
ship” (Furedi 2004, 60).
These tendencies fi nd a perfect vehicle in aloha spirit, which currently 
gathers under a new formulation: Where one stands in relationship to 
belonging in Hawai‘i is negotiated through feeling: through one’s passion 
or sorrow over injustice, and one’s willingness to enact public confessions 
and undertake a redemptive path that fulfi lls the new terms of citizenship. 
That is to say, it is a matter of choice. As citizenship in the capitalist state 
is increasingly equated with consumption, and identity with a marketing 
niche, belonging is understood to issue from choosing specifi c beliefs, acts, 
and behaviors performed to substantiate any claim to political legitimacy. 
Hence the imperative, in Hawai‘i, of “showing aloha”: there is indeed a 
triumph to the idea of “choosing” love in an era when personal behav-
iors and choices resonate politically. Aloha spirit stands with national-
ist difference against cultural imperialism, with emotion and fellow feel-
ing against the cold, hard objectivist claims of Western knowledge. In a 
cultural environment that militates against either self-aggrandizement or 
shaming, “living aloha” subtly reaps the rewards of publicly performing 
virtue. As such, it also requires the contrasting presence of others who fail 
that ideal.
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In The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004), Sara Ahmed cited Freud’s 
theory of how love bonds groups around a shared ideal, in order to explore 
its application to phenomena such as the abstract love of nation. Briefl y, 
when the earliest emotional tie—identifi cation—is frustrated, the subject 
develops a secondary form of love based not on being but on having—in 
the case of a boy, being the father through having the mother. Idealizing 
the loved object allows the subject to be through a fusion with what it 
has. So by determining who one would like to be, one also limits the fi eld 
of whom one would like to have. This economy of the self, which orients 
the subject toward some and away from others, helps to construct a group 
through identifi cation with the same ego-ideal—the nation, for example. 
Moreover, as it is the initial loss of the loved object that is compensated 
through taking on the qualities of that object (introjection), love works 
through an economy of loss. The failure to be “loved back” or to real-
ize the ideal actually increases investment in that ideal by making felt the 
pain of its loss. That is why, in the case of nationalism, we see patrio-
tism strengthened when the nation fails to deliver on its promise for the 
good life (Ahmed 2004, 131). So it is also with aloha spirit, which one 
loves “out of hope and with nostalgia for how it could have been” rather 
than to recognize that love’s promise has not been realized (Ahmed 2004, 
131). This also explains why love narratives must continually threaten the 
loss of the loved object—to make felt the injury that would follow if that 
object were given up. 
The same economy works in the case of multiculturalism. Here the 
external threat is defi ned by requiring that all the diverse others “refuse to 
keep their difference to themselves, but instead give it back to the nation, 
through speaking a common language and mixing with others” (Ahmed 
2004, 134). In other words, they must “show aloha” and fi t in—contrib-
ute ethnic foods to Island potlucks, “talk story” and not stand aloof, so 
they can join the fold (and construct the identity) of the Local. We can see 
how aloha might be central to constructing the state as a multicultural 
ideal: Love becomes the shared characteristic that is put in the place of 
the ego-ideal. “It is now ‘having’ the right emotion that allows one to pass 
into the community. . . . It is ‘love,’ rather than history, culture or ethnicity 
that binds the multicultural nation together’” (Ahmed 2004, 135).
Notice that this setup still requires that certain others be perceived as a 
threat, while disguising behind a discourse of loving everyone the require-
ment to perform aloha. “In such a narrative, ‘others’ . . . in their perceived 
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failure to love difference, function as ‘a breach’ in the ideal image of the 
nation. Their failure to love becomes the explanation for the failure of 
multiculturalism to deliver the national ideal” (Ahmed 2004, 139). This 
also explains why aloha must be constructed under the constant threat of 
disappearance, despite its claims of being bountiful right under the surface. 
Whether it evokes love of kin, hospitality, reciprocity, or multicultural tol-
erance, aloha as a vulnerable, precious difference that can be “given” to 
the world or “shared” with others relies on others who are not part of the 
fold to be brought in, thereby defi ning the nation and its citizens through 
these very acts of aloha. 
Another way of looking at it is to say that projecting onto others the 
negation that sustains the ideal maintains the illusion of self-containment, 
a certain form of subjectivity. Jennifer Harding and Deidre Pribram have 
argued that emotion, as an expression of hegemony, not only makes felt 
the circulation of power but also thereby constructs the subject, and is 
thus critical to establishing social relations and constructing discursive 
and institutional formations (2004, 879). Indeed, the state’s involvement 
in dictating the terms of citizenship already declares subjectivity as some-
thing fi t to be imposed. “It represents skepticism toward the ability of peo-
ple to act as responsible citizens, without the support of professionals who 
know best what is in their interest” (Furedi 2004, 158). As a discourse 
about inclusion and the choice to belong by activating one’s inner good-
ness, the discourse of aloha spirit hides investments in the nation’s need to 
exclude, in the state’s jurisdiction over subjectivity, and in the presumed 
need for both nation and state to govern sentiment. Under the socially 
leveling category of the New Age, aloha spirit thus succeeds in accom-
modating dominant, archaic, and residual meanings, serving as the sign 
of a bridge between past and present that can span gaps in understanding 
through a strategy of defl ection, like a mirror. Aloha spirit expresses an 
intention to refl ect your projected desire back from the other as an ideal 
image of yourself—but at the expense of history. 
Ultimately we cannot know precisely what “aloha” meant before 
it was written down, and it is not germane anyway to this genealogy, 
which is about the construction of a discourse. “Aloha spirit” entered 
the vernacular as the product of an idealized Western gaze on the Native, 
and it has retained through all its infl ections this mirrored identity—an 
ideal constructed through desire. Jack London wrote that “the love of the 
Islands, like the love of a woman, just happens. One cannot determine 
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in advance to love a particular woman, nor can one determine to love 
Hawaii” (1970, 387). London longed to earn the title kama‘äina—“one 
who belongs”—an epithet that can be bestowed only by those who do 
belong, on the basis of “the heart and the spirit” (1970, 401). Yet, this 
aloha, John R Eperjesi noted, “projects a difference, and distance, no mat-
ter how warm and gracious, between the insider and the outsider” (2005, 
112)—which forms part of its allure. Eperjesi sensed in London’s love for 
Hawai‘i what Jacques Lacan called “specular jubilation”—“the process 
by which a subject comes to recognize itself through the projection of 
wholeness onto the other, thus introjecting lack, incompleteness, or inad-
equacy” (Eperjesi 2005, 116). To the degree that Hawai‘i—as state, as 
nation—has been constructed through a history of introjection, the spec-
ter of loss and insuffi ciency will continue to haunt evocations of aloha as 
a likeness that surrounds all meanings. For aloha spirit, strictly speaking, 
can never be claimed for oneself, just like London’s take on kama‘äina. 
Aloha thus works to defl ect eternally onto others the terms of inclusion. 
For these reasons, aloha spirit probably cannot cross the divide between 
competing political interests, for it necessarily belongs to all and none, 
making a “community of spirit” the authority. In the case of Hawaiian 
nationalism especially, a differentiation that cuts dangerously close to a 
history of hybrid forms steeped in projected and introjected desire will 
likely be rejected wholesale in order to further its projects. Kame‘eleihiwa 
suggested as much when she aligned aloha with the peaceful path of Lono, 
noting, “It is Kü whom we have forgotten; the Akua of war, confron-
tation, political power, and debate. . . . It is the Calvinists who taught 
us to reject Kü and all that he symbolized” (1992, 324). An aloha that 
constructs the social and political self through feeling, especially, is detri-
mental to the Hawaiian nationalist project, which must make its terms of 
inclusion increasingly discriminating, even at the cost of refusing aloha. As 
Okamura pointed out, the state ideology of aloha spirit /multiculturalism 
basically argues “for stability and continuation of the status quo rather 
than for substantial change in the current structure of race and ethnic 
relations” (1998, 283). As Hawaiians deploy the term toward the cause 
of sovereignty and cultural revival, and away from more inclusive mean-
ings, aloha discourse must respond with increasingly diffuse applications 
separated from the political. Where aloha once spoke of the organic rela-
tionship between religion and society, it now calls attention to a gap that 
it cannot bridge, between personal and political self-determination.
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Conclusion
Lest my analysis come across as being altogether too negative, I would 
point out that an ideology of love is preferable to what we see ascen-
dant in America today, an ideology of fear. Aloha spirit has survived dilu-
tions of meaning precisely because it has worked—to sell Hawai‘i and 
its people as a destination while preventing interracial confl ict, incendi-
ary nationalisms, or violent uprising against tyrannical state control. The 
discourse of aloha manages to discourage dissent partly because it also 
restrains expressions of hegemony, requiring that they take the form of 
“soft chains.” People raised in Hawai‘i freely profess such Local senti-
ments as “Lucky you live Hawaii” or “Maui no ka oi” (Maui—it’s the 
best); it is newcomers who are prone to express discomfort or rage at the 
discourse of power smoothed over by such slogans. One reason for this is 
an instinctive understanding among people who have made Hawai‘i their 
home—especially those for whom there can be no other—that all groups 
must coexist on an island, real or metaphorical. In fact, there is some evi-
dence that close-knit communities previously acknowledged what Teresa 
Brennan called the “transmission of affect”—the idea that angry feelings 
or beliefs could endanger the well-being of all (2004, 117); Kanahele also 
concluded as much from his research into the origins of aloha in ancient 
sayings (1986, 474). 
Moreover, despite continual attempts by reactionary or opportunistic 
factions to exploit aloha, the trope still is held in high esteem worldwide, 
which opens a space for creative rewriting. I would echo Berlant in saying 
that the reason for critiquing affi rmative emotions such as compassion 
or empathy is not to invalidate them but to see how forms of “progress” 
can at the same time be destructive, supporting social antagonism, for 
instance, by “enforcing normative projects of orderliness or truth” (2004, 
5). Instead of the “fantastical optimism central to the sentimental narra-
tive,” Berlant suggested a “sentimental radicalism” that speaks the “pow-
erful language of rageful truth-telling” (quoted in Woodward 2004, 72). 
Similarly, Ahmed, citing Kaja Silverman, drew a distinction between love 
and idealization, as the latter restricts the ideal to certain subjects (2004, 
140). 
In the case of aloha, I would further distinguish between prescrip-
tive and descriptive deployments. As a value assigned by others and that 
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refl ects their idealization, aloha spirit belongs to the one who speaks, so its 
subtexts belong also to the speaker as a more or less conscious intention. 
Since the action of aloha is to bind some people and not others under an 
invisible “we,” advocacy for aloha spirit is always politically suspect, as 
it hides such investments behind the premise that everyone always already 
belongs. As a learned response to discomfort or outrage, aloha spirit also 
serves to defl ect attention from the site of trauma toward reforming inter-
nal feelings about it. Rather than get angry about economic inequality, 
government corruption, or social injustice, we are encouraged to realign 
subjectivity in order to fi t on the inside of the good nation, where prob-
lems are not seen because our eyes are directed toward the vision of para-
dise, past or promised. Above all, aloha values comfort and equilibrium; 
it cannot incite or sustain revolutionary change—as the legacy of aloha 
‘äina has shown. In the end, aloha spirit, an empty signifi er promising a 
new nation, fulfi lls as do other commodities—by soothing injury with the 
layers of hope and myth that constitute the product itself.
Notes
1 By contrast, Native activist Haunani-Kay Trask saw written language as 
having contributed to the demise of Hawaiian culture. “Where the language had 
once been inseparable from the people and their history, . . . it now came to be 
used as the very vehicle of alienation from their habits of life. The missionaries 
used the language to inculcate in Hawaiians a yearning to be Western and a sense 
of inferiority regarding the Hawaiians’ own culture” (Trask 1987, 160).
2 Aloha continues to be promoted as a solution to the world’s problems. 
A resolution that passed the state House of Representatives in 2003 called for 
“reaffi rm[ing] the value and meaning of aloha in the face of military action in 
Iraq” and support[ing] alternative proposals made in the spirit of aloha that pro-
mote nonviolent solutions in the current crisis in Iraq” (Zimmerman 2003).
3 Candace Fujikane, who had earlier asserted a “Local nation” as a cultural 
nationalist construct defi ned in contradistinction to the Hawaiian sovereignty 
movement (1994), has since acknowledged the primacy of Hawaiian nationalist 
claims (1997, 57), joining a corps of Local Japanese apologists who seek to repo-
sition the Local as a coming to terms with “yellow guilt” (see note 4).
4 Today, largely in response to criticisms by Trask (1999, 2000), “yellow guilt” 
is manifested as a self-denunciatory structure of feeling. See, for example, articles 
by Kosasa, Fujikane, and Okamura in an Amerasia special issue on Asian settler 
colonialism (2000), Fujikane 1997, and Kosasa 2002. Isaki proposed a “shame-
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less theory of agency” in Asian settler colonial politics to “[beg] the question 
of how shame, and feelings generally, are involved in the decolonial endeavor” 
(2006). In what follows, I am indebted to her understanding of the role of shame 
in Local subjectivity. 
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Abstract
From the “Live Aloha” bumper stickers seen throughout Hawai‘i to the state 
constitution advising lawmakers to “give consideration to the Aloha Spirit,” the 
panacea of aloha is trotted out to answer every source of confl ict in the Islands, 
from political to spiritual. The trope has been synonymous with Hawai‘i for so 
long that few people are bothered by its resistance to defi nition, its tendency to 
evoke closure where one would expect to see debate and dissent. I propose that 
this is not only because aloha points toward the things closest to people’s hearts—
family, church, and nation—but also and more importantly because it succeeds in 
obscuring a history of traumatic meanings, all carrying political investments that 
remain couched beneath the seemingly transparent universality of such private 
sentiments as love and kindness. As a metonym for the Aloha State, “aloha spirit” 
serves as both social lubricant and glue, binding a cultural and political entity 
whose membership is contested. Unresolved historical contests run beneath the 
surface, however, driving an economy of lack that serves to keep aloha in motion. 
It is in the interest of divesting the fi gure of its traumatic power that this geneal-
ogy attempts to unpack some of the signifi er’s hidden histories.
keywords: aloha, Hawai‘i, multiculturalism, nationalism, politics of sentiment
